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COMMENT
The Priority of Federal Claims:
Selected Problems and Theoretical
Considerations
Roy Babitt and Susan Freiman*
I. INTRODUCTION3 HEN A DEBTOR'S assets are insufficient to pay all of his
creditors in full, the resulting conflict among creditors is re-
solved through the application of rules of priority. This Article deals
with priority rules governing payment to the United States. Its
purpose is neither to review all the law in the field nor to decide
whether federal priority is per se good or bad. Instead, we shall
examine the appropriateness of present federal priority law in terms
of effectively achieving congressional goals. In doing so, we hope
to impart some understanding of how the government as creditor
acts and how that action relates to the flow of private commercial
credit.
II. THE INSOLVENCY PRIO1UTY
One of this country's oldest statutes provides that when the es-
tate of a debtor of the United States is being administered for the
benefit of the debtor's creditors, the debts owed to the United States
must be paid first.' Nearly all cases have held that this statute must
be given its plain meaning, and that the government is to be paid
first, even before a creditor who holds what would, under state law,
The Authors: Roy Babirt (A.B., LL.B. New York University) is Administrative
Referee of the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York; Susan Freiman
(A.B. Bryn Mawr, LL.B. Yale University, LL.M. (in Taxation) New York University)
is a practicing attorney in New York, New York and an associate member of the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Conference. The views expressed herein are solely the personal
opinions of the authors and are in no way to be considered official expressions.
'31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Section 191). The statute
derives from Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515, and Act of March 2, 1799,
ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 676. It provides:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administra-
tors, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to
the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall ex-
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be a perfected security interest.2 The Supreme Court has indicated
that only a security interest perfected under federal law will de-
feat the sovereign's absolute priority.3
The language of the test used by the Court in determining
whether a security interest has been perfected under federal law is
peculiar to the insolvency area. A competing lien must be "choate,"
or "fully perfected and specific." This means that the identity of
the creditor, the amount of the debt, and the property subject to
the lien must be definite beyond all dispute, and that the creditor
must have nothing further to do in order to assert his right to the
property. At least in cases involving personal property, this test
requires that the creditor have taken actual possession of the prop-
erty.4 While under state law the effectiveness of a security interest
is tested by reference to whether the debtor and creditor intended
to create a security interest and whether other creditors were given
notice of the security,5 the federal test is more stringent in that it
tend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay
all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and
effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process
of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.
There are many articles discussing application of this statute and its history. Among
the more recent are Lacy, The Effect of Federal Priority and Tax Lien Legislation on
Creditors of Vendors and Purchasers, 50 ORE. L. REv. 621, 622-37 (1971); Plumb, The
Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposals for Reform, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1971).
The definitive work in the field is, of course, the three-part article by Plumb, Federal
Liens and Priorities - Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE I.J. 228, 605, 1104
(1967-68).
2 When the competing interest prevails, it generally does so because the court has
concluded that the case is not one to which section 191 applies. For example, in United
States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d 503, 508-10 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the District of Columbia
was paid its taxes ahead of the United States. The court reasoned that Congress intended
its later and more specific legislation, under which the District made its claim, to prevail
over the earlier, general insolvency statute.
3 The Court has never strictly held that a security interest that passes the test for
perfection under federal law would defeat the priority, because it has not yet found any
lien that passed the stringent federal requirements. However, in United States v. Crest
Fin. Co., 368 U.S. 347 (1961), the Court accepted a concession by the United States
that the competing creditors had a choate lien. The security interest in Crest Finance
was an assignment of accounts receivable securing a contemporaneously made loan.
Notice of the assignment had been given to the account debtors, an action that under
other circumstances would be equivalent to transferring possession. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 5232 (McKinney 1963), providing that a levy upon intangible personal
property is made by delivering a notice to the account debtor.
4 Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-203(1), -302, -303 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
There are, of course, other kinds of statutory security interests, such as the familiar me-
chanic's lien and artisan's lien, created to protect certain classes of creditors favored by
state legislatures. New York even has a lien for service of stallions or bulls. N.Y. LIEN
LAW § 160 (McKinney 1966). For the purpose of this article, however, when refer-
ence is made to a lien or security interest, we mean a consensual lien, that is, a lien created
by the consent of the parties to the contract.
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renders liens ineffective so long as contingencies exist which, even
though remote, are theoretically possible.6
Furthermore, the choateness requirement is applied to private
liens in competition with a federal claim but not to the federal
claim itself. Section 191 speaks of "debts" due the government,
so there is no need for the government to establish anything more
than an unpaid obligation.7  It is not even necessary that the debt
be certain. In United States v. 58th Street Plaza Theatre, Inc.,
8
for example, the United States recovered a transfer to creditors as
to whom the United States had priority under section 191, although
at the time of the transfer the debtor was solvent and there was
not yet any obligation to pay the government.9 This was, to be
sure, an extreme case, since the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance
to the taxpayer's director, wife, and children, all of whom were
stockholders. 10
The amount of the debt owing to the government under section
191 is measured as of the date of the insolvency proceeding, with-
out regard to subsequent events." This rule might appear to state
the obvious, but consider subsequent events that would, given other
circumstances, entitle the debtor to a credit against his federal lia-
bility. The Supreme Court dealt with such a situation in Massachu-
setts v. United States,'12 a case involving liability for federal unem-
ployment taxes (FUTA). The Internal Revenue Code provides
that an employer is entitled to a credit against the federal tax (the
6 The contingency that defeats perfection can be very remote indeed. In United
States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955), the-Supreme Court held a lien to be inchoate
where an insolvent debtor had but two days within which it could post a bond to free
property seized by the debtor's landlord. See also United States v. Waddill, Holland &
Flinn, Inc, 323 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1941), where the Court said "[clonceivably the
amount of rent due was uncertain on the day of the assignment [for the benefit of credi-
tors]. The landlord may have been mistaken as to the rental rate or as to payments pre-
viously made and the tenant may have been entitled to a set-off."
7 United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
8 287 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
9 The expansive definition of debt which permitted the United States to recover is by
no means unique to the federal priority statute. See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270
(McKinney 1945), which defines "creditor" as one who has "any claim, whether ma-
tured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." See also
Bankruptcy Act § 307, 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1970).
10 287 F. Supp. at 498. Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), which suggests
a firmer basis for the ruling.
31 Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., 61 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288
U.S. 613 (1933).
12 333 U.S. 611 (1948).
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FUTA credit) if payments are made for state unemployment taxes.
The amount of the credit is reduced if the state is not paid on time,
but the credit is not forfeited by that default.13  When the tax-
payer in this case filed an assignment for the benefit of creditors
pursuant to a state insolvency proceeding, neither the state nor the
federal unemployment tax had been paid. The Supreme Court held
that section 191 required the federal taxes to be paid in full, and
further, that section 191 precluded all right to any credit for
amounts subsequently paid to the state. The rationale for the
Court's conclusion seems reasonable: "It is at least doubtful on the
statute's wording that obligations wholly contingent for ultimate
maturity and obligation upon the happening of events after insol-
vency can be said to fall within the reach of 'debts due' as of the
time of insolvency."' 4
The Massachusetts case has been criticized,' 5 and it does lead to
anomalous results. The case rests on section 191, which is inappli-
cable in bankruptcy proceedings because it is inconsistent with the
specific priority rules mandated by the Bankruptcy Act.' 6 The
FUTA credit is, therefore, available to estates being administered in
bankruptcy but not in other types of insolvency proceedings.' 7  There
may well be reasons for Congress to prefer that estates of federal
debtors be administered under the supervision of federal judicial
officers, but it is doubtful that the best way to achieve this result is
by encouraging debtors to go into bankruptcy through the use of a
tax credit against unemployment taxes.
In summary, therefore, the absolute federal insolvency priority
contained in section 191 creates several anomalies. Before evaluat-
ing the effect of this provision, and of the federal priority generally,
we turn to a discussion of other bases of federal priority.
13 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3302.
14 333 U.S. at 626-27.
15 The Federal Priority in Insolvency, supra note 1, at 71-79.
16 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
17 The FUTA credit is not the only instance in which the payment of claims is af-
fected by the choice of proceeding. In bankruptcy, federal taxes share pro rata with
state and local taxes, which must be paid in full before any payment is made on non-tax
debts of the United States, while in other types of insolvency proceedings, state and
local taxes in certain circumstances take priority over a federal tax claim. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 6323(b) (6) (A); Bankruptcy Act §§ 64(a) (4)-(5), 11 U.S.C. §§
104(a) (4)-(5) (1970). A more sympathetic case can be made for wage earners, who
in bankruptcy are accorded second priority, but in non-federal insolvencies are given no
priority over the United States. In re Kupshire Coats, Inc., 272 N.Y. 221, 5 N.E.2d
715 (1936); Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1970).
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III. THE FEDERAL PIUORlTY UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A. Background of the Tax Lien Act of 1966
When a tax is assessed,18 the amount of the liability becomes.a
"lien"'" on all the nonexempf2  property of the taxpayer.21  Un-
less the defaulting taxpayer obtains a discharge in bankruptcy of
his tax debt,2 2 or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has allowed
the statute of limitations on collection to expire,23 the lien will con-
tinue to encumber the taxpayer's present and future property24 un-
til the liability is satisfied. Moreover, even though no notice is
filed publicly, the lien will defeat the claims of other creditors of
the taxpayer unless the other creditor is able to establish that he is
within one of the classes of creditors protected by section 6323
of the Internal Revenue Code.25
The status and overall effect of federal tax liens was recently
examined by Congress when it enacted the Tax Lien Act of 1966.26
As the Act's framers saw it, that statute was to be the first compre-
hensive revision of the internal revenue laws concerning the rela-
tionship of federal tax liens to the interests of other creditors. 7
Some courts have since gone further than Congress and construed
18 An assessment is the entry of an amount of the liability on the dockets of the In-
ternal Revenue Service. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6203.
19oWe shall not discuss the problems encountered in attempting to define "lien" un-
til the end of this article, after we have prepared the reader for some of the problems
involved. See notes 184-85 infra & accompanying text. For present purposes, a useful
definition is that we are dealing with a "lien" rather than a mere "priority" if the credi-
tor's rights in specific property are enforceable regardless of the debtor's financial condi-
tion. In re J. R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 1971). It should be ob-
served, however, that this distinction is less useful than it might be, as the creditor's
concern arises because of the debtor's financial condition. See H.B. Agsten & Sons,
Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1967) (Hayns-
worth, J., concurring).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6334.
21 Id. § 6321.
2 2 Most tax debts cannot be discharged. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. §
35(a) (1) (1970).
2 3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6502-03. If the statute is about to expire, the govern-
ment may sue to reduce the claim to judgment, under id. § 7403. The time to collect
that judgment is governed by the laws of the various states. FED. R. Civ. P. 69.
24 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
25 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L No. 89-719, 80 Star. 1125 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954).
27S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3722.
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this tax legislation as permitting subordination of non-tax federal
claims.2 8
The dominant purpose of the 1966 legislation was to make the
relevant lien provisions of the Internal Revenue Code conform to
the concepts developed in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
in an attempt to deal with "a multitude of technical problems. ' 29
As the UCC was itself called for by the evolution of business prac-
tices involving protection for secured creditors not previously pro-
tected, so Congress thought it desirable to make the lien provisions
of the tax laws conform with those business concepts developed
under state law. °
Pre-1966 law gave purchasers and certain categories of secured
creditors priority over a tax lien until notice of such lien was filed
in accordance with state law filing statutes. These priority credi-
tors were limited to mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judg-
ment creditors, with additional protection given to mortgagees and
pledgees of securities and to purchasers of motor vehicles."' The
main impulse of the 1966 legislation was to improve the status of
private secured creditors by: (1) extending protection against un-
filed tax liens to mechanic's lienors; (2) providing a clear defini-
tion of certain classes of secured creditors already protected regard-
less of choateness at the time notice of the tax lien is filed; (3)
broadly increasing the classes of creditors holding property interests
for whom super-priority was to be given even against a noticed tax
lien;32 (4) giving priority status to certain interests created even
after filing of a tax lien if they arise under specified types of finan-
cing agreement entered into before filing of the tax lien; and (5)
2 8 See text accompanying notes 72-89 infra.
29 S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3722-23.
30 Id. at 2, 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3723.
81 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6321-23, 68A Stat. 779; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§
3670-72, 53 Stat. 448. See S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted
in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3722, 3723.
32 Super-priority was extended to purchasers of tangible personal property sold at re-
tail in the ordinary course of the seller's business, to repairmen of tangible personal
property, to attorney's liens for reasonable fees, and to insurance companies to the ex-
tent of policy loans made to an insured. Beyond this, super-priority was also extended
to casual purchasers of tangible personal property from a nondealer involving a sales
price of less than $250, and to banks and building and loan associations with regard to
passbook loans, where the purchaser or the bank or building and loan association was
without actual knowledge of a filed tax lien.
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providing a time period up to forty-five days for further protection
of some security interests after filing of notice of the tax lien.33
B. Other Legislation Subordinating Federal Claims
Subordination of federal claims under the Internal Revenue
Code can be best understood in the context of other existing legis-
lation subordinating governmental priorities. Such legislation is not
new.Y4 For example, 31 U.S.C. section 20335 provides that no lia-
bility of an assignor to the United States or one of its departments
or agencies, regardless of how such liability arose, shall create any
liability on the assignee of the claim to make restitution, refund,
or repayment to the government of any amount the assignee might
have received under the assignment. This statute was designed to
facilitate the financing of defense contracts by banks and other lend-
ing institutions."0
Another example is 15 U.S.C. section 64631 which subordinates
a security interest of the Small Business Administration (SBA) to a
lien for local property taxes, if that property tax lien would, under
local law, be superior to a privately held security interest. This
subordination was endorsed by the SBA, with the approval of the
Bureau of the Budget, and was designed to treat the SBA like a
private creditor in relation to local governmental units.38
The Bankruptcy Act also reflects congressional decisions to favor
particular industries at the expense of a uniform scheme for distri-
bution of a debtor's assets. As early as 1935 Congress decided to
facilitate the financing of railroad equipment acquisitions by amend-
ing section 77(j) of the Bankruptcy Ac3 ' to permit certain sellers
and lessors of equipment to repossess equipment despite the com-
33 S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3722, 3723-24.
34 Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government, 63 YALH Lj. 905,
927 n.128 (1954).
35Act of May 15, 1951, ch. 75, 65 Stat. 41, amending Assignment of Claims Act of
1940, ch. 779, 54 Star. 1029.
365S. REP. NO. 217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951). See also 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1970),
(as amended by Act of May 15, 1951, ch. 75, 65 Stat. 41).
3715 U.S.C. § 646 (1970).
38S. REP. No. 1714, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3080.. Congress intended to limit the government's claim against
particular assets by subordinating its claim to local taxes on those assets. See also
CONFERENCE REPORT, STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE,
id. at 3084.
39 11 U.S.C. § 205(0) (1970), (as'amended by Act of Sept. 4, 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-295, 71 Star. 617).
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mencement of bankruptcy proceedings, 4° even though the bank-
ruptcy court could stay all other secured creditors.
Congress exhibited a similar desire to benefit an individual in-
dustry when it amended section 116 of chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act to extend this favored treatment to creditors who had financed
aircraft and aircraft equipment. 41  Congress found justification in
the financial problems facing many of the nation's smaller airlines
that needed to replace obsolete equipment. The legislative history
discloses Congress' feeling that the amendment would result in an
increased availability of capital.4 2  The amendment permitted
parties to a lease or a conditional sales contract involving aircraft
and aircraft equipment to agree to waive the applicability of chap-
ter X proceedings insofar as such proceedings might affect title and
right to possession. Accordingly, in the event of default and bank-
ruptcy, the right of the secured creditor to take possession was pro-
tected against the bankruptcy court's injunctive power.
A later amendment to section 1164' extended favored status to
vessels utilized by any water carrier holding a certificate of public
convenience and necessity or a permit issued by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. While the Commission, the Department of
Transportation, and the Bureau of the Budget all supported this
amendment, the support of the Bureau of the Budget was condi-
tioned on an understanding that the Bill would not affect current
procedure for the filing of federal tax liens against property of
a delinquent taxpayer. The legislative history reveals Congress'
intention not to alter the tax lien procedure established in the in-
ternal revenue laws.44
C. judicial Determinations of Federal Government Priority
Even where express congressional subordination cannot be
found, the courts have not been loath to trench on the revenue pow-
40 H.R. REP. No. 1283, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); S. REP. No. 1336, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935).
41 11 U.S.C. § 516(5) (1970).
42 H.R. REP. No. 944, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
43 11 U.S.C. § 516(6) (1970); Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-586, § 2, 82
Stat. 1149.
44 S. REP. No. 1094, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. REP. No. 1932, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968). Interestingly, the Congress that passed the 1966 Tax Lien Act exhib-
ited less tenderness for the tax gatherer. In dealing with tax lien subordination to the
"casual" purchaser involving a sale for a price of less than $250, Congress expressed an
intention that the IRS not pursue "casual" sales involving more than $250 if it would
not have done so before the 1966 Act. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1966), -reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3722, 3726.
THE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
er where a strong societal need has been demonstrated. Thus the
government has sometimes lost cases in which specific legislation
designed to achieve a desired end or overcome a specific mischief
has collided with a statute of broad general applicability such as
section 191.45
In United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 46 for example, the Su-
preme Court dealt with the applicability of section 191 to a claim
arising under title II of the Transportation Act of 1920.47 The
Court concluded, despite Congress' silence on the subject, that "the
entire spirit of the Act makes clear the purpose" that the indebted-
ness arising under the Transportation Act was meant to be excluded
from the reach of section 191.48 Title II authorized government
financing to protect the existing transportation system, and the Court
feared that giving priority to the government over other creditors
under section 191 would defeat that protective purpose. Thus
while the United States was accorded priority over unsecured credi-
tors, the Court concluded it was entitled to no priority over secured
and other preferred creditors. The Court did not further elaborate,
however, on which creditors were to be protected against the go-
ernment's priority.
In another case, Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co.,49 the Court was
faced with a claim by the Director General of Railroads that sec-
tion 191 entitled the government to a priority on the debtor's vol-
untary assignment of its assets. The Court rejected that contention
and concluded that section 10 of the Federal Control Act5° fore-
closed a holding that the government was entitled to section 191
priority merely because it exercised overall supervisory control over
the nation's railroads. The Court said that such federal control was
not meant to alter the substantive rights of parties "as they would
have existed but for federal control." 51
In a third case, Cook County National Bank v. United States,52
the Supreme Court concluded that section 191 was not applicable to
government claims against insolvent national banks. The Court
45 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970). See text accompanying notes 1-17 supra.
46 280 U.S. 478 (1930).
4TAct of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, §§ 200-11, 41 Stat. 456.
48 280 U.S. at 485.
49 271 U.S. 236 (1926).
50 Act of March 31, 1918, ch. 25, § 10, 40 Stat. 451.
51271 U.S. at 239.
52 107 U.S. 445 (1882).
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based its decision on its view that the national bank legislation was
a separate code, neither limited nor enlarged by other statutory pro-
visions respecting claims against insolvents. The Court said that a
law embracing an entire area, dealing with all its phases, withdraws
the subject from the operation of a general statutory provision53
such as section 191. 54
The courts have not always been consistent, however, in respect-
ing the strong social needs that lay at the core of the enactment of
some of the statutes we have touched upon, but instead have some-
times attempted to construe the language of particular legislation in
such a way as to accommodate its purpose with that of section 191.
In In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc.,55 for example, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, finding that the SBA is an integral part
of the federal government and entitled to the priority of the sov-
ereign,5 6 concluded that section 17 of the Small Business Adminis-
tration Act57 did not operate to subordinate the SBA loan to the
payment of state taxes. The court held that Pennsylvania capital
stock, corporate income, and corporate loan taxes were not taxes
on property within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. section 646 and were,
therefore, not entitled to priority over the SBA claim.58
Similarly, the same court in United States v. Oswald & Hess
Co.,59 concluded that apart from the question of choateness, local
water and sewage charges were not taxes due on property within the
meaning of 15 U.S.C. section 646, and accordingly could not defeat
the federal government's priority. The Tenth Circuit, however, fo-
cusing more squarely on the issue, gave a chattel mortgage held by
the SBA priority over a state tax lien on the ground that the federal
mortgage was fully choate.60
In United States v. Emory6 the Supreme Court dealt with sec-
tion 191 in the context of a state court equity receivership involv-
53 Id. at 451.
54 A typical example of specific legislation superseding section 191 is Bankruptcy Act
§ 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970), fixing priorities of creditors including the national
sovereign in bankruptcy proceedings.
55 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965).
56 See SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 450 (1960).
57 15 U.S.C. § 646 (1970).
58 The SBA argued that section 191 applied to give the federal government priority,
but the court did not find it necessary to reach the question. 341 F.2d at 401.
59 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cit. 1965).
60 Director of Revenue v. United States, 392 F.2d 307, 313 (10th Cit. 1968).
61 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
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ing application of the National Housing Act, as amended.6" The
Court ruled that section 191 is to be construed liberally to effectuate
its purpose, which the Court defined as the securing of adequate
public revenue to sustain the burden of government." The Court,
therefore, concluded that nothing in the National Housing Act was
designed to take away the priority conferred by section 191.64 The
Court saw no inconsistency between the National Housing Act and
section 191. The private creditor argued unsuccessfully that section
191 should not apply because its effect would be to chill the exten-
sion of credit to private borrowers. The Court felt that this could
be true as to all claims of the United States and saw no reason to
amplify the plain reach of the special legislation to defeat the sec-
tion 191 priority. The majority also rejected an argument that
section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act65 expressed a general purpose
to subordinate federal claims, concluding that that priority statute
applies only in bankruptcy proceedings.66
Four Justices, led by Mr. Justice Reed, disagreed.67  They rea-
soned that in all likelihood the 1934 Congress which passed the Na-
tional Housing Act gave no thought to section 191, and that the
true legislative purpose could not be gleaned from a mere reading
of the statutes in pari materia. Rather, the dissenters asserted that
the purpose of the later National Housing Act should be gleaned
from general expressions of purpose and then compared to judicial
interpretations of the reach of section 191. On that premise they
concluded that section 191 was generally inapplicable in cases in-
volving public financing legislation where the claims of creditors
were in competition with the national sovereign's entitlement.
Finally, in United States Department of Agriculture v. Re-
mund,68 the Court was concerned with claims of the Farm Credit
Administration asserted in a state probate proceeding. The Court
read the Farm Credit Act6" as a statute calling for emergency finan-
cial relief to distressed farmers having nothing to do with restora-
62 Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 847,48 Stat. 1246.
63 314 U.S. at 426.
64Id. at 430-33.
65 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
66 314 U.S. at 428-29.
67 Id. at 433.
68 330 U.S. 539 (1947).
69 Act of Feb. 23, 1934, ch. 23, 48 Stat. 354; Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 648, 48 Stat.
1021, 1056.
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tion of their credit status. Accordingly, the Court concluded, there
was no prohibition against applying section 191 against other
claims.
D. The Tax Lien Act of 1966 and Non-Tax Liens
The 1966 Congress, which enacted the Federal Tax Lien Act,
appeared ready to accept "equitable limitations on the priority of
Federal tax liens,""0 but the language of the legislation went no
further than to subordinate federal tax liens in nonbankruptcy or
noninsolvency cases.7' A troublesome aspect of this legislation is
the manner in which the judiciary has applied it to liens other than
tax liens.
In H.B.Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Savings
Bank,72 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the SBA was entitled to priority over a mechanic's lien that was
inchoate at the time the SBA made its loan to the debtor. The
court construed the language and history of the statute and held that
the Tax Lien Act subordinated only unrecorded federal tax liens
and not other federal claims.73 The court of appeals read the 1966
legislation as one of a series designed to effect precisely limited ex-
pansions of the category of secured creditors protected from secret
70 The Federal Priority in Insolvency, supra note 1, at 9.
71 In 1966, Congress enacted amendments to the Bankruptcy Act restricting the
government's priority. The amendment to section 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970),
achieved, among other things, what United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965), had
effected a year earlier when the Court invalidated an unfiled tax lien against a trustee in
bankruptcy. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, § 5, 80 Stat. 269. The amend-
ments to sections 17(a) and 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a), 104(a)(4) (1970), limited
the priority of tax claims to taxes which became "legally due and owing" within the
three years preceding the bankruptcy. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, §§ 2,
3, 80 Stat. 270. There is much doubt about what that means. See, e.g., In re Able
Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 425 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1970); In re Laytan Jewelers, Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Kopf, 299 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
Many kinds of taxes are, however, expressly excepted from discharge and therefore re-
main entitled to priority. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 17(a)(1) (a)-(e), 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 35(a) (1) (a) 1(e), 104(a) (4) (1970). In the experience of the authors, nearly
all tax claims in bankruptcy cases fall within one of these exceptions and therefore are
accorded priority.
2 388 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968).
73 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the same result in United
States v. General MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675, 678-79 (2d Cit. 1972),
stating:
We are unable to conclude, however, that a congressional enactment, carefully
drawn, which affects the priority of federal tax liens leaves the courts free to
disregard prior precedents and thus to broadly extend the scope of the statute's
principle to other unspecified areas which, though somewhat analogous, were
simply not addressed by the Congress.
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federal tax liens, finding that it was not illogical for Congress to
retain priority for money actually lent by the government, while at
the same time relinquishing its priority for its tax liens, which do
not represent financial outlay but rather are predicated on taxpayer
delinquency.
A separate concurring opinion74 concluded that if it were not
for the impact of United States v. Vermont,75 there would be seri-
ous question whether section 191 even survived the enactment of
the Tax Lien Act. In United States v. Vermont the Supreme Court
had concluded that section 191 was applicable in insolvency cases,
but that where there was no insolvency, Congress had failed to pro-
vide expressly for federal priority. 6  Similarly, in Ault v. Harris77
the court was unable. to perceive any reason why, in a dispute be-
tween a mechanic's lienor and the SBA, it should apply a rule
more stringent than that which Congress thought desirable in the
tax field under the Tax Lien Act.
An issue in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Carter78
was whether a Farmers Home Administration (FHA) loan had
priority over a claim for attorney's fees expressly provided for in
a first mortgage to which the FHA loan was admittedly subject.
The government79 urged, on the authority of United States v. New
Britain,80 that the first mortgagee's lien for attorneys' fees was not
choate and that, accordingly, the FHA claim was superior. The
government noted that the choateness of lien test, although origi-
nating in the tax lien area, had been extended to subordinate liens
which were superior under state law to nontax mortgages held by
the federal government.8
The court, however, emphasized the fact that the FHA volun-
tarily took its second mortgage in full awareness of the attorneys'
fees clause in the first mortgage. In the absence of what it termed
"binding legal precedent,"' the court looked to the Tax Lien Act
for guidance. Recognizing that "the 1966 Amendment does not of
74 388 F.2d at 161.
75 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
761d. at 358.
77317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), ajJ'd mem., 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
78446 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
7 ) The Farmers Home Administration is a branch of the federal government. 446
F.2d at 138.
80 347 U.S. 81 (1953), discussed in text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
81446 F.2d at 138-39.
821d. at 139.
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itself affect the priority of the claims here involved," the court
nonetheless felt that that statute diminished the vitality of the
choateness of lien test in the tax field. That being postulated, the
Connecticut Mutual court concluded that it would be contrary to its
view of Congress' purpose to allow a money-lending agency of the
government with a mortgage lien to prevail in a case where, had
the government held a tax lien, it would have subordinated its in-
terest on a broader front.' Accordingly, the court approved priority
for the attorneys' fees under the first mortgage. The dissent vigor-
ously opposed this extension of the Tax Lien Act to include non-
tax mortgage liens, concluding that such a step was a matter for the
legislature.8 5
There is something to be said for the position of some courts
that the sovereign's generosity expressed in the 1966 tax statute
should be extended to all cases where the government or a federal
agency is a claimant, save for insolvency where section 191 would
govern. But the focus of the 1966 legislation and the limited reach
of specific legislation touching some government priorities indicate
that Congress was not yet prepared to go so far. There is a vast
difference between a tax lien asserted because a taxpayer has been
delinquent in paying his share of the revenues needed to run the
government and a lien securing a financial interest obtained by the
government's extension of funds "out-of-pocket." ' 6 For tax debts
the government is an involuntary creditor, since it never chose to
lend money to the defaulting taxpayer and did not enter into the
transaction in the hopes of making a profit. Although it is argu-
able that the IRS assumes the risk of loss when it allows delin-
quencies to continue, as a practical matter this argument is not per-
suasive. The government cannot begin to police all taxpayers as
closely as that hypothesis requires. In contrast, for debts created
by the government in its capacity as a lender, such as loans made
by the SBA, policy considerations more closely support treating the
government like other lenders. Similarly, debts arising out of
breach of government contracts are closely analogous to private
breach of contract claims. Not only is the government acting rather
88 Id.
84 Id.
8Id. at 141-43.
86 It is suggested in H.B. Agsten & Sons that Congress may have intended to pro-
tect loans, rather than tax losses which do not involve spending by the government, and
that that purpose might reconcile the enactment of the Tax Lien Act with failure to
imend section 191. 388 F.2d at 160.
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than being acted upon, but it has the option to structure the trans-
action so as to obtain protection, an option not available when a
taxpayer makes the unilateral, secret choice not to pay his taxes.
8 7
Apparently Congress' mood in the last few years has been to
forego some federal revenue for the sake of the vitality of the
commercial world. Yet despite its mood, Congress has gone only
so far and, as the dissent in Connecticut Mutual88 points out, when
courts apply a tax lien statute to areas that Congress did not in-
tend it to cover, they tread on Congress' power to determine the
extent of its bounty. If Congress meant to go as far as some com-
mentators have suggested and some courts have held, then an over-
haul of section 191 is dearly in order in insolvency cases as well. 89
E. The Internal Revenue Code versus Section 191
There is also some uncertainty concerning the relationship of sec-
tion 191 to the Tax Lien Act. One question is whether the Internal
Revenue Code is the exclusive statute for tax priorities, or whether
section 191 will apply if a taxpayer is insolvent. There is, in addi-
tion, some doubt whether principles established under section 191
to test choateness are to be used under the Internal Revenue Code.
Because a creditor's rights do not spring into existence fully ma-
ture, and because most of the creditors favored by Internal Rev-
enue Code section 632390 are so favored only if they have achieved
a preferred status before the tax lien is filed, problems arise in de-
termining whether the competing creditor has achieved section 6323
status before tax lien filing. Supreme Court cases decided before
enactment of the 1966 Tax Lien Act made it extremely difficult for
a creditor to take advantage of the protection that the Internal
Revenue Code seemed to give because the Court imported the
requirement of choateness from section 191 into the pre-1966 tax
lien area.
For example, in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank,91
87 Cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Foley, 399 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1968), in which the
court recognized that "if the materialmen [the creditors who lost the case] wish to estab-
lish priorities in these uninstalled materials and protection from federal tax liens, they
may still avail themselves of the contractual secured interests which are protected under
lINT. REV. CODE OF 1954] § 6323." Id. at 318.
88 446 F.2d at 141-43.
89 The Federal Priority in Insolvency, supra note 1, at 93-108.
9 0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
91 340 U.S. 47 (1950) (involving Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 36, §§ 3670-72, 53
Stat. 448, which is substantially the same as Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 64, §§ 6321-
23, 68A Star. 779, before amendment by the Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L No. 89-
719, § 6323, 80 Stat. 1125).
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a federal tax lien was recorded after a private creditor's attachment
lien had been filed against the debtor's real estate, but before the
attaching creditor had obtained judgment. The Court held that the
private lien was inchoate, or contingent, because "[n]umerous con-
tingencies might arise that would prevent the attachment lien from
ever becoming perfected by a judgment awarded and recorded. '92
Although the private creditor had a judgment good against every-
one else, "[h]e had a mere 'caveat of a more perfect lien to
come' "93 vis-a-vis the federal government. The Court rested its
holding squarely on section 191, saying that in insolvency such a lien
would not be sufficient to defeat the government's claim.9 4  In other
words, under one reading of the case, a lien must be choate under
the section 191 test before a federal tax lien is filed or it will be
defeated by the government, irrespective of whether it qualifies un-
der section 6323. This reading would nullify section 6323 in cases
of insolvency. A more reasonable interpretation of the case is that
a creditor must achieve section 6323 status before the tax lien is
filed, and that it is not enough for the creditor to file a notice that it
expects to achieve section 6323 status sometime in the future. 5
In United States v. New Britain,96 however, the Supreme Court
92 340 U.S. at 50. Another case in which a private creditor's claim was subordinated
to the federal claim because of failure to attain "choateness" is United States v. R.F. Ball
Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958). There the competing creditor was a surety on a con-
struction bond, to whom the taxpayer has assigned as collateral all sums to which he
had a present or future claim under the bonded construction contract. The government
had lost in the lower courts on its claim under the tax lien sections of the Internal
Revenue Code. Offering little analysis, the Court reversed and ruled for the govern-
ment, saying only that "the instrument involved being inchoate and unperfected, the
provisions of § 3672(a) ... do not apply." Id. at 587. Section 3672(a) of the 1939
Code was the predecessor of section 6323 of the 1954 Code. It provided that an as-
sessment lien, arising under section 3670 of the 1939 Code (section 6321 of the
1954 Code) would not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judg-
ment creditor until notice thereof had been filed. All the Ball case apparently says is
that a consensual security interest in future accounts receivable does not defeat the tax
lien under the earlier version of section 6323. In Crest Fin. Co. v. United States, 368
U.S. 347 (1961), however, the government conceded in the Supreme Court that a
creditor who held an assignment of existing and due accounts receivable, and who had
sent notice of the assignment to the account debtors, did have a choate lien. That con-
cession is particularly striking in view of the strong opinion for the government by the
court of appeals relying on the Ball case in Crest Finance, 291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961).
The distinction may be that Ball involved an assignment for future and, therefore, con-
tingent indebtedness, where as Crest Finance involved an assignment for security of a
present, existing debt.
93 340 U.S. at 50.
94 ld. at 51.
9r The Court in Security Trust & Savings discussed and rejected "the doctrine of rela-
tion back - which by process of judicial reasoning merges the attachment lien in the
judgment and relates the judgment lien back to the date of attachment." Id. at 50.
96 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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awarded judgment to a local government on the ground that its
tax lien, a statutory rather than consensual lien, was specific because
it attached to specific parcels of real estate, so that under the In-
ternal Revenue Code the lien was "perfected in the sense that there
is nothing more to be done to have a choate lien . . . the identity
of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the
lien are established."97 Absent legislation to the contrary, the New
Britain Court continued, a lien that is "the first in time is the first
in right."'
The only problem with this "first in time, first in right" test is
that it does not indicate when a claim has ripened sufficiently to be
"first." Thus, in United States v. Buffalo Savings Bank," the Court
cited New Britain but reached a contrary result. In Buffalo Savings
Bank, a bank and the taxpayer executed a loan secured by a real
estate mortgage. Thereafter, the United States filed notice of a tax
lien, plus the liens for local taxes attached to the property. Subse-
quently, foreclosure proceedings were brought by the bank. The
Court held the United States to have priority over the subsequently
accruing liens for local real estate taxes, despite the fact that the
federal lien was general in that it attached to all the taxpayer's
property, including that already encumbered by the bank's mort-
gage.
The Court also applied the New Britain test in United States v.
Pioneer American Insurance Co.,"° where the federal government
defeated a claim for attorneys' fees asserted under a private mort-
gage. The private creditor had commenced foreclosure proceedings
against the real estate before the federal tax liens were filed, and
the terms of the private mortgage extended the security to cover
fees incident to the foreclosure action. The Court, applying the
New Britain test, found that the mortgage was not choate because
the amount of the lien had not been fixed at the time the tax lien
was filed.
Congress seems to have tried in the 1966 Tax Lien Act to take
the determination-of perfection, or "choateness," away from federal
law, leaving the states with the power to define the property rights
that the Internal Revenue Code protects.'' The legislation thus in-
971d. at 84.
981d. at 85.
99 371 U.S. 228 (1963).
100 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
0l1 Note, Choateness and the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 MiNN. L. REv. 198,
211-17 (1967).
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dicates that federal laws, such as section 191 and its tests for choate-
ness, are no longer determinative in tax cases. However, it remains
unsettled whether Congress intended the Tax Lien Act of 1966 to
bar completely the application of section 191 when only tax debts
are involved.102 Section 191 establishes a priority and has nothing
to do with liens, whereas sections 6321-23 of the Internal Revenue
Code apply only to taxes, do create a lien, and apply in all tax cases
regardless of solvency. 0 3  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
hinted that tests for choateness are different for liens competing
against a tax lien than for liens competing against a section 191
priority. 10 4
There are therefore several unresolved problems about the rela-
tionship of the Tax Lien Act to section 191. Will the choateness
test remain important to claims not protected by section 6323 that
arose before assessment, and that could therefore, under a claim
of being "first in time," assert priority over an assessment lien under
Internal Revenue Code section 6321 ?105 Will a choateness test have
to be passed by a section 6323 creditor in order to prevail over a
subsequent tax lien?106  Does section 191 prevail over all liens? x"'
The government seems inclined not to litigate a claim under sec-
0 2 Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests
Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HARv. L REV. 1369, 1380, 1418
(1968). See, e.g., Commissioner of Ky. Dep't of Revenue v. United States, 383 F.2d 13
(6th Cir. 1967), which rejected the argument that section 191 should be read so as to be
tempered by the amendments to section 6323. The state there was, however, neither ajudgment lien creditor nor a creditor for real estate taxes, so probably it would have lost
even if the court had applied section 6323. In another case the United States lost a claim
to priority for a tax debt under section 191 over mortgages which were protected under
section 6323. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 346 F.2d 141 (5th Cr.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957). The Internal Revenue Code continues to recognize
the priority of tax debts under section 191. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6901
(a) (1) (B), 6901(c) (3), 7421(b) (2).
103 H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Say. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 160
(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968).
104 United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1964).
105 Lacy, supra note 1, at 623.
10 6 See id. at 633. The author there asserts that a section 6323 creditor should not
have to pass a choateness test to defeat a subsequent tax lien. Since the section 6323
creditor could defeat a prior-in-time federal lien, it must, Lacy argues, be intended to pre-
vail over one subsequent in time.
107 On the one hand, Lacy argues that the federal claim should prevail over a mere
private claim since it is of paramount importance that the United States be paid ahead of
other creditors. This rationale is more persuasive applied to a liquidation of an insolvent
business, after which the debtor is no longer in existence, than applied to the bankruptcy
of an individual, from whom the government can still collect its non-dischargeable taxes.
On the other hand, Congress did not see fit to give the United States a high priority in
bankruptcy proceedings. So it can be argued that section 191 was not intended to prevail
over all liens. Id. at 634.
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tion 191 when the case would, except for insolvency, be covered
by section 6323. Although such a claim might be asserted if there
were large sums involved or if there were exceptional circumstances
such as abuse by a fiduciary, the IRS appears to believe that it is un-
fair for the government to assert section 191 against creditors who
have relied on section 6323 and perfection under the UCC, especial-
ly since section 6323 says the government will respect perfection un-
der the UCC. This IRS practice leaves the government in a posi-
tion of being required to file tax liens shortly after an indebtedness
accrues in order to compete with private secured creditors. There
is some apprehension that such early filing of tax liens could seri-
ously impair the taxpayer's credit standing. On the other hand, it
may be unfair to permit private lenders to remain ignorant of a
prospective debtor's tax liability.10 8
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL
PRIORITY AND STATE LAW
A. Conflicting State Priority Choices
There is such a welter of laws establishing schemes of priorities
among the fifty states that we shall not attempt to discuss all possible
alternatives. Many state priority rules are not clearly labeled as
such, thereby leading to contradictions even within the system of one
state. Thus, for example, article 3-A of the Lien Law of the State
of New York'0 9 imposes a trust on funds to be paid or received in
paymnt for construction on real estate.110 The statute states that
the purpose of the trust is to provide payments for specified costs
related to. the cohstruction."' Although the expenses to be paid
by the trust are listed in five sub paragraphs which suggest an or-
der of importance, a later section within the same article of the
statute provides that if an action is brought to enforce the rest of the
10 8 The competing policies behind the dispute on whether the government should
pursue collection vigorously were discussed by the Congress, that ultimately chose to limit
the priority for stale taxes, thereby penalizing the government for failing to enforce obli-
gations promptly. This legislation amended the priority for tax claims in bankruptcy
proceedings, mentioned supra, note 71. The legislative history may be found at H.R.
REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1965), reprinted in 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 770;
S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6-7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2442, 2448-51; S. REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2468-73; 111 CONG. REc 18,961-
62 (1965); 112 CONG. REc 13,809-23 (1966).
'
0 9 N.Y. LEN LAW §§ 70 to 79-a (McKinney 1966).
2o Id. § 70.
111Id. § 71.2.
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article, then specified "classes of trust claims shall have preference,
in the order named,' 112 the first of which is taxes withheld from
the wages of the employees working on the job. The Court of
Appeals of New York, in two cases decided on the same day, held
that the United States does113 and does not"4 collect ahead of me-
chanics' liens asserted under article 2 of the statute." 5 The cases
can be reconciled, but by a hypertechnical, conceptual distinction
between the real estate itself and a fund of money paid into court
as a substitute for the real estate. Such distinctions may be mete for
theoreticians, but they wreak havoc upon a businessman's planning.
B. The Property Rights Approach
One way of dealing with statutes containing conflicting schemes
of priority is to change the question from which claim has priority
in an item of property to a question of whether property exists to
which a given lien can attach. Thus, a decision that no item of
property exists to which one of the statutory schemes would apply
would leave only one set of distribution rules." 6
This "property rights" approach has been used by the Supreme
Court. The Court applied it in United States v. Bess"I7 to deter-
mine the extent to which a lien for taxes owed by a decedent
entitled the federal government to recover from the proceeds of
the taxpayer's life insurance policy ahead of the beneficiary. The
Court said that the government could collect only through its lien,
since under state law, creditors would not have any right to en-
force their claims against the beneficiary." 8 The lien could pro-
1121d. § 77.8.
113Harman v. Fairview Assocs., 25 N.Y.2d 101, 250 N.E.2d 209, 302 N.Y.S.2d
791 (1969).
114Onondaga Commercial Dry Wall Corp. v. 150 Clinton St., Inc., 25 N.Y.2d
106, 250 N.E.2d 211, 302 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1969).
115 N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 3 to 39-c (McKinney 1966).
116 This approach was followed by a lower New York court that resolved a conflict
between two articles of the Lien Law by holding that as a result of perfection of a me-
chanic's lien under one part of the statute, there was no fund to which the other part of
the statute could attach consequences. Hall v. Blumberg, 26 App. Div. 2d 64, 270
N.Y.S.2d 539 (1965).
117357 U.S. 51 (1958).
118 Id. at 5 3-54. No issue was raised as to the power of Congress to create such a
claim for the government if it chose to do so. This is an area in which Congress had not
created a cause of action, thereby leaving it to state law. Id. at 56-57. Congress deliber-
ately chose to allow state law to define the extent of the government's ability to collect
taxes from transferees, even at the sacrifice of "uniformity of liability." Commissioner v.
Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958). Justice Black dissented in Stern, joined by Justice Whittaker
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tect the government only to the extent that the taxpayer owned
property during his life to which the lien could attach, and al-
though under the policy he had the right to designate and change
the beneficiary, he never had the right to receive the proceeds him-
self, since they were not payable until his death. Under the insur-
ance contract, however, he did have the right to surrender the
policy and collect cash. The Court determined that this was a
property right to which the lien could, and did, attach. The gov-
ernment was therefore given judgment against the beneficiary to the
extent of the cash surrender value.119
Bess involved the government's right to collect from a person
who had received assets from the taxpayer before the taxes were de-
termined. In Aquilino v. United States20 the Court went further
and clearly articulated the principle that tax liens attach only to
those assets which, under state law, are the property of the taxpayer.
This may seem to be an obvious principle, until we examine the situ-
ation in which the Court applied it. The taxpayer, who was the
general contractor for real estate improvements, failed to pay sub-
contractors and the federal government. The subcontractors
filed notices of mechanics' liens shortly after the government had
filed its notice of federal tax liens. In the state court action by the
subcontractors to foreclose their liens, the owner of the real estate
paid into court the money owing the general contractor, and the
litigation continued with the United States substituted as defendant.
The trial court held for the plaintiffs on the ground that the govern-
ment had failed to file its notice of lien in the proper place.'2 '
and Chief Justice Warren, on the theory that because uniformity in the tax law is so im-
portant, it would require a clearer congressional expression to leave the law to vary
among the states. Id. at 47-50.
119 357 U.S. at 58-59. The Court was constrained to justify this entirely reasonable
result by characterizing the benefits as composed of two types of payment: the compensa-
tion for the loss insured against and a fund made up of the excess of the premiums paid
in the early years of the policy over the actual risk in those early years. Although this
analysis is an accurate description of the economics of insurance, it has no relevance in
determining the competing creditors' claims to the proceeds. The analysis was not even
necessary, since the Court had already ruled that "[rQhe transfer of the property subse-
quent to the attachment of the lien [i.e. the payment of the proceeds of the policy to
the benefidary upon the taxpayer's death] does not affect the lien." Id. at 57. The
concurring opinion would have arrived at the same result by enforcing against the
beneficiary a lien on the cash surrender value. Id. at 59-60. The dissent found per-
suasive the argument that an insurance company's promise to pay cash surrender value
terminated on the taxpayer's death and that, therefore, the property interest subject to
the lien ceased to exist. Id. at 60-62.
120 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
121140 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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The state appellate court affirmed, but on the ground that there
had been no debt owed the taxpayer by the owner of the real estate
and that, therefore, there was nothing to which the government's
lien attached.'22 The court reasoned that the fund that was the sub-
ject matter of the litigation had been paid into court by the owner
as a substitute for the land, and that because the United States had
no lien on this land, since its claim was against the contractor-tax-
payer, the government could not assert a claim to the fund."~ The
highest state court disagreed, however, and held that the tax lien
had become effective as to the fund before the claims of the sub-
contractors.' 4
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
majority viewed it as involving a controversy over the kind of prop-
erty right the taxpayer had. 25 It remanded the case to the state
court for it to decide this question of "the nature of the property
rights possessed by the taxpayer under state law," and to state
clearly the extent to which it had looked to federal law in resolv-
ing the lawsuit.'26 Justice Harlan noted in his dissent, 127 how-
ever, that the Court was really giving the state the power to create
rules of distribution that supersede conflicting federal rules.
Aquilino is unlike Bess, in which the Court recognized that
122 2 App. Div. 2d 747, 153 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1956).
123 Cf. Harman v. Fairview Assocs., 25 N.Y.2d 101, 250 N.E.2d 209, 302 N.Y.S.2d
791 (1969); Onondaga Commercial Dry Wall Corp. v. 150 Clinton St. Inc., 25 N.Y.2d
106, 250 N.E.2d 211, 302 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1969). This technique of looking to sub-
stitutions of kinds of property as an easy way out of thorny problems is an unfortunate
way to resolve a dispute. Litigants will often need to substitute one asset for another,
such as money for a machine, in order not to cripple normal operations which have
nothing to do with the lawsuit, except that they require use of an asset against which the
adversary asserts a claim. There is too much abrasiveness in litigation as it is, and the
parties should be free to make these amicable adjustments unhampered by fear of prej-
udicial consequences. The problem is very acute when, despite the most careful plan-
ning, results can be upset by occurances which have no real meaning to the substance
of the transaction.
1243 N.Y.2d 511, 146 N.E.2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957).
125 363 U.S. at 512. The subcontractors argued that the taxpayer had only "bare
legal title" to the proceeds of its contract with the owner, while they, the creditors, held
beneficial ownership to at least so much of the proceeds as was necessary to satisfy their
claims. Id. at 515. The government had argued that the interest held by those credi-
tors was nothing more than "an ordinary lien." Id.
126 Id. at 515-16. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
contractor did not have a sufficient beneficial interest in the monies due from the owner
under the contract to give him property rights in them, except insofar as there would be
a balance remaining after other statutory beneficiaries had been paid, and thus the federal
government's tax lien against the taxpayer was ineffective to reach monies due the subcon-
tractors. 10 N.Y.2d 271, 176 N.E.2d 826, 219 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1961).
127 363 U.S. at 516.
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Congress had consciously refrained from establishing a federal rule,
thereby leaving the area open to state regulation.'M The tax-
payer in Aquilino had a "property right" to receive payment under
a contract. Under the reasoning of Aquilino, when a state legisla-
ture provides that certain creditors are to receive payment out of
the proceeds of a contract, a court could say that the taxpayer's
property is nothing more than his equity after satisfaction of those
creditors, thereby compelling federal rules of distribution to defer
to state rules.
The Second Circuit, however, in United States v. Toys of the
World Club, Inc.,m" interpreted Aquilino in a way that limits the
delegation of power to the states to determine rules of distribution.
The court stated that Aquilino shows "that the mere excess of a
lien over the value of taxpayer's property is not enough to warrant
a conclusion that the property no longer 'belongs' to the taxpay-
er . . ."13 In effect, this approach uses an interest in receiving the
equity as a means of permitting the tax lien to cover the entire
property.
Bess and Aquilino may be read to support the principle that
property must be viewed as comprising what Judge Friendly has
called a "bundle of rights,"'' with each different right being a
"property interest," some of which belong to the taxpayer and are
therefore subject to a tax lien, while others do not belong to the
taxpayer. Thus in Bess the lien attached to so much of the total
insurance contract as represented the taxpayer's enforceable claim
to receive cash surrender value, but did not attach to that part of
the contract which represented the non-taxpayer beneficiary's right
to receive benefits. From this perspective, the asset to be distrib-
uted in Aquilino was not a unitary asset, irrespective of whether that
asset was considered to be the real estate or the taxpayer's right to
be paid by the owner. Rather, there were rights to compensation
in all the people involved in the construction contract - the owner,
the general contractor, the sub-contractors, the suppliers, the labor-
ers, and the taxing authorities.
Unfortunately, this kind of analysis will not make the funda-
mental problem disappear. The fact remains that the only existing
128 See note 118 supra.
129 288 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1961).
130 Id. at 91. See also Fine Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 328 F.2d 419 (2d Cit.
1964).
131 Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
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asset that could be taken was the limited sum the owner owed the
general contractor. When a court holds that a given number of
dollars represents one of the bundle of rights and is to go to the
owner of that right, it is in fact directing distribution out of the
total fund and thereby determining priorities.32
A further problem with the "property rights" approach applied
in Aquilino and Bess is that those cases do not articulate a rule ap-
plicable in situations where federal law also purports to define prop-
erty. Neither case mentions section 7501 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which provides that income and social security taxes with-
held by an employer from wages'33 are "a special fund in trust for
the United States."'134 The employer must remit to the government
the taxes withheld." 5 If he fails to do so, section 7501 carves a
trust from his other assets, the beneficiary being the government.
In effect, the Internal Revenue Code creates out of the taxpayer's
assets a property right for the government to the extent necessary
to satisfy the amount of taxes withheld but not paid over. Creat-
ing this "property right" is no different from establishing a scheme
of priorities, as the Court has recognized," 6 but it is also no different
from creating a property right under federal law, which should
supersede conflicting state law.
In 1967, with Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,"7 the Supreme
Court further complicated the relationship between federal priorities
and state law. It held that even in a situation in which it is clear
that federal consequences, here estate tax, are determined by the
character of a property interest under state law, and even when the
courts of the state have defined the character of the property inter-
est, federal courts can nevertheless re-examine the issue and, though
applying state law, arrive at a different definition. Mr. Justice
Clark, writing for the Court, first ruled that the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to the litigation in the
132 This determination of priorities can become particularly apparent in cases in-
volving the circularity of lien problem. See, e.g., the discussion in the legislative history
of the amendment to Bankruptcy Act § 67(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1970), which at-
tempted to resolve the circuity problem. H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965).
133 "Employer" and "wages" are words of art in this context. They are defined in
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3401 (a), (d), to include anyone paying compensation for
services, whether or not the payor is the person for whom the services are rendered.
"34 Id, § 7501(a).
135Id, § 3403.
136 United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971).
137 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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Tax Court, because the government had not been made a party to a
previous state court proceeding that determined the character of
the property interest for probate purposes.138  Then, because the lit-
igation turned on application of a federal statute, the Court looked
to the legislative history and concluded that Congress had intended
state court determinations to be conclusive only when the determi-
nation was made "in a bona fide adversary proceeding," a finding
that is to be made by a federal court. 39 Furthermore, the Court
went on, federal case law indicates that even a decision made in an
adversary proceeding free of all hint of collusion is, if made by
any court lower than the state's highest appellate court, only one
fact to consider, 14 along with decisions from courts of other states,
in deciding how the state's highest appellate court would rule. The
majority opinion concluded, in all seriousness, that "this would
avoid much of the uncertainty that would result from the 'non-
adversary' approach and at the same time would be fair to the tax-
payer and protect the federal revenue as well.' 141
It seems a bit hard on taxpayers to allow the government to
await the outcome of litigation in the state court while it remains
free to reject any determination it dislikes142 since it cannot be com-
pelled to participate if it chooses to refrain. 143  Further problems
may be present if there is no adversary for the taxpayer other than
the federal government. 144  The problem is not that the fiduciary is
138 Id. at 463. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had ruled that the gov-
ernment was bound by the state court determination because the state court had jurisdic-
tion over the parties as well as over the subject matter, and the government could have
intervened in that litigation. 363 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S.
456 (1967).
'39 387 U.S. at 464.
140 1d. See also Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706, 708 (2d Cit. 1962), in
which the court advocated referring to state property law in problems of statutory con-
struction "for, if not the answer, at least a hint," on the presumption that Congress "had
ordinary property concepts in mind."
141387 U.S. at 465. The rule enunciated by the Supreme Court is presented more
persuasively by Judge Friendly in his dissenting opinion in the court of appeals. 363
F.2d at 1015-19.
142See, e.g., Pittsburgh v. United States, 359 F.2d 654 (6th Cit. 1966).
143 It is possible to get jurisdiction in limited kinds of lawsuits. 28 U.S.C. § 2410
(1970).
144 This can easily happen. In Surrogate's Court proceedings, for example, the
characterization of a power of appointment as general or special can have impact on
availability of a marital deduction under federal estate tax law. The potential increase in
tax liability will reduce the size of the estate available for distribution to the beneficiaries,
so there is incentive for private parties to present a case for the power's being general.
There will, however, be no one whose interests are served by presenting a case for the
power's being special. This is what happened in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363
F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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without remedy, because there will almost always be a federal
forum,'45 but that if federal rules of distribution are to be de-
cided with reference to concepts of "property," and if "property in-
terests" are to be redefined by federal courts according to their in-
terpretations of state law, then uncertainty will burden taxpayers.
Careful planning can be upset when a federal court uses its own
experience and policy considerations to arrive at a result that was
unanticipated during commercial negotiations among persons fa-
miliar with state court interpretations.
Two more problems with the property rights approach are sug-
gested by Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Foley,146 another case involving
the construction industry. 47 There, the taxpayer, who was the
general contractor, had failed to pay a supplier, who, under New
York law, had a right to repossess any supplies that had not been
put into the construction. The supplier had not, however, exer-
cised that right when the IRS filed liens for unpaid taxes and levied
on those supplies. The government prevailed over the material-
man's argument that "its right to repossess and remove under
145 Some taxpayers are not able to litigate in the Tax Court, either because they are
barred by statute, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6871, or because the Tax Court lacks sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine "deficiencies," id.
§§ 6214-15, which are defined to include only income, estate and gift taxes, and excise
taxes on private foundations. Id. § 6211(a). This limitation precludes Tax Court litiga-
tion over withholding taxes, which in the experience of the authors is overwhelmingly
the most common tax liability in insolvency proceedings. If there is no Tax Court juris-
diction, then the taxpayer must bring a refund suit, which requires payment of the entire
amount of tax claimed by the government. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
In the case of employment taxes, the government generally will not object if the tax-
payer pays the amount sought for one employee and sues for refund of that employee's
taxes, thereby litigating the issue of all employees; except in extreme cases, the govern-
ment will refrain from pressing the balance of its claim while the suit is pending.
Nevertheless, a case can easily be imagined in which no court action to dispute the claim
can be maintained. For example, a receiver of a liquidating company is given a proof of
claim for income taxes in an amount greater than the estate. He cannot go to the Tax
Court because he is denied access by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6871, and he is unable
to pay the full tax so he cannot bring a refund suit. Nor will he be able to dispute the
liability in an action to enjoin collection. Id. § 7 4 21(a); Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). There is no jurisdiction in the federal district court
to hear a suit for a declaratory judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). No action for
mandamus will lie because the receiver is not seeking to compel a purely ministerial act.
This gap seems too horrendous for discussion in a mere footnote, but apparently it is not
a practical problem since there do not seem to be any cases on it, unless of course the
lack of cases is caused by the magnitude of the problem.
146 399 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1968).
147 The construction industry is notorious for defaulted withholding taxes. In
1966, Congress added section 3505 to the Internal Revenue Code, Act of Nov. 2, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 105(a), 80 Star. 1125, making certain lenders responsible for their
borrowers' failures to pay withholding taxes; the motivation for such unusual third party
liability was supplied by the construction industry.
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[state law] is a property right in the uninstalled materials which
upon exercise extinguished the Internal Revenue Service lien which
attached only to the property or interest in the property which the
contractor then had."' 48
The court, analyzing the state statute and relevant legislative
history, found that the law was intended to give a remedy to the
creditor. The court recognized that the question involved the ex-
tent of the taxpayer's property rights since the tax lien attached
only to the rights that the taxpayer had. But the court held that
under New York law the materialman did not retain a property
interest in the assets sold to the taxpayer; "rather, it seems likely
that the legislature, without engaging in the use of property labels
imbued with special meaning or legal consequences, merely intended
that a right to repossess ... materials should accrue ... if and when
the project is completed or abandoned.' 1 49
The first problem with this seemingly forthright approach is
that it depends on a distinction between retaining an interest in
the property transfered and reacquiring an interest after transfer
of all the property. This distinction, relied on by the court, does
not comport with reality. In one kind of transaction, property is
transferred to a taxpayer who then transfers certain limited rights
back to the transferor; in another, the transferor retains limited
rights for himself and transfers only the balance of the asset to the
taxpayer. There is no difference in result because ultimately both
taxpayers are holding the same rights -in the asset. The choice of
the route taken can, however, make a substantial difference in the
effect of a lien asserted against the taxpayer. If the first route is
chosen and the lien becomes effective before the transfer back to
the transferor, the lien asserted by the government will cover the
entire asset. 50 If the second route is taken, the government's lien
attaches only to the value of the property less the interest retained
by the transferor. The critical question, then, is whether there was
a reconveyance or only a transfer with a retained interest. But
this could be either a state law issue because it is closely related -to
definitions of property, or a federal law issue because the answer
determines the scope of a federal tax lien.
148 399 F.2d at 316.
149Id. at 317.
L50 A tax lien will cover all property acquired by a taxpayer in the future. See
text accompanying notes 18-24 supra. The lien would therefore attach to all the prop-
erty at the instant it is conveyed to the taxpayer, and any reconveyance of the asset will
be subject to that encumbrance.
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A second problem raised by Bethlehem Steel v. Foley is that the
case considers "property" as though it exists apart from its value.
Although the court accepts the rule that the tax lien attaches only
to the taxpayer's property, it fails to take into account the basic eco-
nomic reality that what the taxpayer owned was not an unfettered,
right to the asset but a right limited by the creditor's right to re-
possess that asset. The court talks as though the taxpayer acquired
a complete, exclusive interest, ignoring the right of the material-
man to act, a factor diminishing the value of the taxpayer's prop-
erty right.
This distinction is clearer if we look at what would happen upon
sale of the asset by the taxpayer. If the taxpayer were to sell the
asset, he would get a lower price for his interest if it is subject to a
materialman's right to repossess. The result might be different if
the materialman's right to repossess were terminated by a convey-
ance, so that a buyer could purchase a complete interest.'5 ' If un-
der state law the creditor's right could be terminated by a convey-
ance to a bona fide purchaser, then we need be less concerned that
the effect of the court's holding is that the filing of a federal tax
lien cuts off the supplier's right to repossess, since the supplier's
right to repossess is already limited by the chance of such a con-
veyance. If, on the other hand, the state law were that the right of
the creditor survives such a conveyance, 5' the taxpayer and the
creditor can both be accommodated if we apply a principle that
splits the property rights economically, rather than one that iden-
tifies different rights in the property and transfers those rights sepa-
rately. Such a division could be accomplished by appraising the
rights of the competing creditors, selling the entire bundle of all
the rights, and dividing the proceeds in the same proportion as
the appraised value of each particular creditor's claim bears to the
appraised value of the whole.
Suppose, for example, that a person who owes the government
more than $15,000 in taxes owns a custom-built Cadillac with an
appraised value of $15,000, and that the owner-taxpayer also owes
a bank $11,000 on a note secured by the car. Assume further, how-
ever, that there is some doubt as to the validity of the bank's lien
151 Conceptually, this would be equivalent to a rule under which a seller could, in
effect, convey more than he himself owned. Such conceptual anomaly should not, how-
ever, be an insurmountable obstacle if the rule works otherwise.
152 We recognize that under the many state laws, the interest might be extinguished
by certain conveyances but survive other events. An analysis of the subtleties of different
hypothetical occurrences is beyond the scope of this Article.
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and that this doubt reduces the appraised value of the bank's claim
to $10,000.153 The value of the government's interest in this asset
would then be the $5,000 balance. If the sale of the car nets'54
$9,000,1" the government would be paid five-fifteenths of the
$9,000, or $3,000, and the bank would receive ten-fifteenths, or
$6,000.
C. The Unifortm Commercial Code
A significant inter-relationship between state and federal law, in
terms of everyday commerce, is in the area of security interests cre-
ated under the UCC, a statute solicitous of the needs of secured
creditors. 5 6 Thus, under the UCC, the filing of a security interest
protects the creditor's interest in the collateral, 5 7 and it attaches
when the creditor has given value and the debtor has acquired rights
in the collateral.5 5 A financing statement may not give a fully per-
fected lien when filed, but if it is subsequently perfected, that per-
fection will relate back to the time of filing.' 59
In the area of federal law, the Supreme Court has rejected the
possibility that subsequent perfection can be related back to pro-
tect a private lienor from the government's priority. 6 ° Neverthe-
less, it appears that Congress has accepted the notion that a lien
may be perfected although the amount remains uncertain because
no advances have yet been made, and although the property sub-
ject to the lien is still uncertain because the debtor has not yet ac-
153 This kind of evaluation of litigation hazards is made every day by lawyers in de-
iding for how much to settle a case. The fact that an appraisal is not a precise figure,
but only an approximation, is not reason to reject appraisal.
154 The expenses of the sale should be deducted before the prorating is done. Each
creditor would then be contributing his proportionate share of the expenses - in other
words, each would be paying to the extent he was benefited by those costs.
155 There are many reasons why the sale may yield less than an appraisal. Ap-
praisals can be of "going concern" value, "orderly liquidation" value, or "forced sale"
value. Since we use the appraisal value only for a basis for proration, it does not mat-
ter which we take.
156 One writer has asserted that secured creditors are entitled to greater protection
than unsecured creditors because they see to it that the unsecured creditors, who supply
day-to-day needs, are paid. Gordon, Unconscionability in Bankruptcy: The Federal Con-
tribution to Commercial Decency, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 741, 758 (1972). We have seen
little evidence to support this suggestion of secured creditors' altruism.
157 UCC §§ 9-302, -303.
158Id. § 9-203 (1972 version).
L51 d. § 9-312(5)(a).
160 United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950), discussed
in text accompanying notes 91-95 supra.
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quired it.' These uncertainties would, under traditional federal
law, render the lien highly susceptible to government attack as in-
choate. 6 1
This Article will not begin to analyze the UCC, whose mystery
is surprisingly underestimated by practitioners.6 3 What is clear
is that the legislatures that enacted it articulated a strong desire to
favor secured creditors. For example, the UCC gives a secured cred-
itor the right, in the event of insolvency proceedings, to take the
debtor's cash and bank accounts to the extent of cash received in the
ten days before the proceedings are begun. 6 4
We can appreciate how startling this favoritism is, when we com-
pare this section to sections 60 and 67(a) of the Bankruptcy Act,6 5
under which many transfers16 to unsecured creditors within the four
months before inception of the proceeding can be recovered by the
trustee. Under the Bankruptcy Act the Supreme Court has refused
to permit the government to attach a bank account unless it is able
to trace the dollars in that account, in spite of a federal statute'
specifically imposing on the bank account a trust for the benefit of
the United States. 6 8
It is also instructive to contrast this solicitude for the secured
creditor, who should be in a good position to protect himself and
who entered into the transaction in order to make a profit, with
the treatment given the pre-paying buyer, often a helpless con-
sumer, when the seller becomes insolvent before delivering the pur-
chased goods.'6 9
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We shall eschew the temptation to offer a "conclusion" evalu-
ating the government's priority as "good" or "bad." Apart from
our reluctance to moralize, we are aware that any such evaluation
161 Note, supra note 101, at 210, giving citations to the legislative history.
162 See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
163 See Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J.
185 (1967).
164 UCC § 9-306(4)(d).
165 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107(a) (1970).
166 "Transfer" is defined in the Bankruptcy Act as broadly as possible and includes
granting a security interest. Id. § 1(30).
167 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7501(a).
168 United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971).
169 Schrag & Ratner, Caveat Emptor - Empty Coffer: The Bankruptcy Law Has
Nothing to Offer, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1972).
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could be met by persuasive contrary ones, derived from competing
theory, practical considerations, or precedent. We shall, however,
make some observations.
First, it is important to keep in mind the true significance, in
terms of dollars, of what we are dealing with. The proportion
of an estate that goes to taxing authorities compared to that going
to other creditors is smaller than one would surmise from the heat
generated in discussions of the federal government's priority. The
relevant figures should correct any misimpression that the govern-
ment dominates the distribution.'"7 One fact demonstrated by these
170
Year Ending June 30
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Total* 152,915 175,227 181,326 187,206 163,827
-' Asset Cases 18,513 18,532 19,144 21,360 22,355
. Nominal & No. 127,142 136,667 141,012 143,046 131,258
P 6 Asset Cases
Admin. Fees & $24,905,409 $24,617,313 $23,803,515 $22,517,054 $26,446,037
Expenses (25.7%) * (24.8%) (22.8%) (24.5%) (23.4%)
Secured Credi- $28,444,911 $32,427,785 $35,997,004 $30,460,665 $37,499,8600 tots (29A%) (32.6%) (34.5%) (33.1%) (33.1%)
q Wages $ 2,157,072 $ 2,100,433 $ 1,877,529 $ 1,637,766 $ 2,029,528
(2.2%) (2.1%) (1.8%) (1.8%) (1.8%)
t; All Taxes $10,776,094 $11,224,590 $ 9,740,973 $ 9,534,138 $11,220,470(11.1%) (11.3%) (9.3%) (10.3%) (9.9%)
. Other Priority $ 1,698,124 $ 1,464,061 $ 1,195,326 $1,136,555 $ 1448,594
(1.8%) (1.5%) (1.1%) (1.2%) (1.3%)
Unsecured $24,213,866 $24,194,351 $27,571,008 $23,164,977 $30,810,542
' Creditors (25.0%) (24.3%) (26.4%) (25.2%) (27.2%)
Other Pay- $ 4,580,840 $ 3,358,693 $ 4,052,929 $ 3,578, 603 $ 3,681,785
ments (4.7%) (3.4%) (3.9%) (3.9%) (3.3%)
2 Secured $28,444,911 $32,427,785 $35,997,004 $30,460,665 $37,499,860
:6 to d (60.7%) * (62.6%) (72.0%) (70.1%) (76.4%)
, U ij All Priority $14,631,245 $14,789,084 $12,813,819 $12,308,462 $14,698,600
0 - (37.6%) (36.7%) (34.0%) (34.0%) (34.1%)
0 o Unsecured $24,213,866 $24,194,351 $27,571,008 $23,164,977 $30,810,542
2 (7.5%) (6.9%) (7.5%) (6.8%) (7.8%)
Includes cases dismissed.
* These percentage figures represent the percent of proceeds realized, i.e. $24,905,-
409 was paid for administrative fees and expenses, which was 25.7 percent of the estate.
* ** These percentage figures represent the percent of the claims paid, that is, Secured
Creditors were paid a total of $28,444,911, which represented a 60.7 percent payment
of secured claims.
These figures are drawn from tables F 4a, F 5 and F 6, ADMIKISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY CASES COMMENCED AND
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statistics is that in 1969, a typical year, all taxing authorities -
state, local, and federal- collected less than $11.25 million, which
represented under ten percent of the total realized from bankruptcy
estates. This percentage was a poor fourth after the amounts paid
to secured creditors (who came out best, with nearly a third of all
the property administered), to the fiduciaries administering estates,
and to general creditors.
Although the amount of revenue raised by virtue of the federal
priority, as demonstrated by these statistics, is not great, revenue
raising is the historic purpose of the priority.' While this historic
rationale of the priority may be challenged, the argument for re-
tention of the priority is buttressed nonetheless by the ability of the
priority to serve two other important functions as well, a sanction
and deterrent function, and a ceremonial function.
The importance of the sanction and deterrent function is ap-
parent when the role the priority rules play in meeting the collection
problems encountered by the government is considered. Procedures
for collecting directly from debiors are beyond the scope of this
Article, which views the Federal priority in the context of collecting
a debt from persons other than the debtor himself, specifically per-
sons administering the estate of the debtor.'7 2  The priority rules
are part of a broad statutory scheme for enforcing liabilities against
third parties who have, honestly or otherwise, gained possession of
the debtor's property. The insolvency priority, section 191, is com-
plemented by section 192,1'7 which states:
Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person. who
pays, in whole or in part, any debt due by the person or estate for
whom or for which he acts before he satisfies and pays thie debts
due to the United States from such person or estate, shall become
answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of such pay-
ments for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much
thereof as may remain due and unpaid.
TERMINATED IN UNITED STATES DIsTRIcr COURTS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR JUNE
30, 1965 and from these tables for the years 1966-1969. Payments to the federal gov-
ernment are not separately stated; they are included with state and local taxing author-
ities in the column "all taxes," and with other creditors entitled to a fifth priority under
Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) in the column, "other priority."
171 The priority statute was to be broadly construed to achieve this purpose. United
States v. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832). The doctrine of the unperfected
lien was developed in response to fears that state legislatures could, by defining liens, sub-
stantially impede collection by the federal government. United States v. New Britain,
347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954).
172 Section 191 does not apply so long as a debtor is in possession of his own prop-
erty, no matter how insolvent he is. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102,
133 (1838).
1731 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). See also 28 U.S.C. § 959 (1970).
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Section 192 has been construed to impose personal liability even
when the fiduciary had obtained a court order directing the pay-
ment to the junior creditor,' 74 although the extent of the liability
is limited by the size of the estate at the time the claim is asserted. 5
The Internal Revenue Code has characteristically elaborate pro-
visions defining the responsibility of a "fiduciary," a term which,
though broadly defined, is not all-inclusive.77 The fiduciary must
notify the IRS of his qualification'77 and is responsible for the tax
obligations of the taxpayer, including the obligation to file returns.' s7
The government may collect a tax from the transferee of the tax-
payer's property by the same assessment and collection procedures
available to it when proceeding against the taxpayer directly.'
If these provisions, combined with the priority given the federal
government, seem to be an example of over-kill, consider the gov-
ernment's problem when a delinquent taxpayer turns out to be in-
solvent. The government must try to collect from whomever has
the property that should in one form or another have been used
to pay taxes. The government is, however, at a serious disadvan-
tage since it lacks the information necessary to identify the tax-
payer's transferees.' In most private lawsuits, each party knows
at least his own version of what happened, but in the government's
collection suit all the facts and evidence are in the hands of the
adversary. This situation is not unlike an executor of a decedent's
estate trying to bring a wrongful death action without witnesses.
The government is also at a disadvantage in policing its debts.
Unlike trade creditors who are attentive to the daily needs of their
debtors and who are constantly involved in the collection of ac-
counts receivable, the government is usually not involved in the day-
174 King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329 (1964).
'75 Want v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1960).
176 "The term 'fiduciary' means a guardian, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver,
conservator, or any person acting in any fiduciary capacity for any person." INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(6). It does not include an agent, even if he has "entire
charge of property... merely turning over the net profits from the property periodically
to his principal .... " Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-7 (1960).
177 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6036.
178 Id. §§ 6012(b), 6903. See also 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970).
179 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6901(a). There are provisions extending the stat-
ute of limitations on such collection. Id. §§ 6901 (c)-(f). Compare id. § 6901 (a) with
id. § 6672, the so-called 100 percent penalty, which makes employers personally liable
for withheld taxes. The effect of section 6672 is that the officers of a bankrupt corpora-
tion will be required to pay any withholding taxes that are not paid on distribution of the
estate.
180 The government will have the burden of proof. Id. § 6902.
1973]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 521
to-day operations of its debtors and is therefore likely to be among
the last to learn of the debtor's financial problems. The creditors
who discover such problems last are the last to enforce collection,
and some statutory protection is necessary lest no property be left.
While government collection may be painful to the private credi-
tors at whose expense the government takes payment, nevertheless
the government represents all taxpayers and it is their money that
is being sacrificed.' 8 ' Protecting parties who are not in a position
to protect themselves is an appropriate judicial function.', 2
The "ceremonial function" of federal priority suggests values
that come from according the sovereign a certain respect greater
than that given private parties in the marketplace. Ultimately, the
integrity of our tax system, being one of self-assessment, depends
on the integrity of the taxpayers. In our experience, the psychologi-
cal importance of according a priority to the sovereign is of great
significance in maintaining the respect necessary for the system to
work. People can be expected to do what is pleasant, and there is
nothing pleasant about paying taxes. Indeed, it is often hard to
find any rational justification for the sacrifice the payment entails.
To some extent, though, people are inherently law-abiding, and
the priority probably serves a psychological purpose by affording
the gratification that one is doing the right or at least the lawful
thing. Without the priority, we might expect to see a greater fail-
ure to pay even the diminished amount.
Aside from the issue of whether the priority should exist or not,
it should meet other criteria if it is to operate. A statute operates
detrimentally when businessmen are either unable to comply with
the law or cannot plan their actions according to it intelligently be-
cause its operation is subject to unpredictable contingencies. What
we are really asking is that a given statute be clear and uniform in
its application.ls 3
181 See Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 487 (1926)
(section 191 is to be liberally construed because it protects the public good).
182 For an extreme statement of this position, see Gordon, supra note 156, sug-
gesting that the bankruptcy court should exercise its potential for playing an active
role in the development of commercial law and practices through invalidation of security
interests on grounds of unconscionability, in order to protect the public interest, as well
as the interests of the debtor and creditors.
183 By "uniform in operation" we mean that the same result should follow regard-
less of whether the assets of a private creditor's debtor are administered in an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, a bankruptcy proceeding, a foreclosure, or a suit to reduce a
tax lien to judgment. The rules of section 6323 df the Internal Revenue Code are im-
portant when there is not enough money to pay all competing creditors, and if they are
to apply at all, the creditors should be able to know they will apply in all cases. We are,
THE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
The problem is that we must use words to establish the priority
rules, and examination reveals that those words have less content
than one would guess from their illusion of certainty. The word
"lien" connotes one kind of priority rule. To say, for example,
that a lien is valid against a trustee in bankruptcy means that the
claim represented by the lien will be paid ahead of the claims of
the creditors whom the trustee represents. 1 4  "Lien" is a symbol for
a particular kind of property claim to which others must defer,
but it is a symbol used without agreement on its definition or its
function in particular situations. When courts seek to determine
whether a given creditor has a "lien," they really determine whether
he has taken the necessary action to give him preferred status. There
is, however, a judicial tendency to see a "lien" as a thing that
exists in absolute terms, apart from its context.
The criteria that define "lien" in one case may not be relevant
in another case involving different statutes and different competing
claims. Therefore, it is of little help to adopt a method of analysis
that merely imports a finding of "lien" from another context. What
is necessary is an examination of where one creditor stands in rela-
tion to other creditors, realizing that there are many different kinds
of "liens" and realizing further that a determination that any par-
ticular creditor has a "lien" may give sufficient information to an-
swer the question of the priorities among all creditors.
The harm caused by an absolutist conception of the word "lien"
is that it produces a rigidity that freezes relationships at a given
point in time. Commerce is a dynamic continuum of relationships,
and a creditor's rank rises and falls in relation to other creditors
as he moves through time, selling, extending credit, and taking ac-
tion to collect on the debt. A viable priority rule cannot depend
on a static relationship between only two parties.
Equally important as the vitality of commerce, though, is the
therefore, at something of a loss to understand the enormous effort put into proposing
amendments to section 191, when the statute as amended is to apply only to tax cases.
The Federal Priority in Insolvency, supra note 1, at 96-97. Similarly, it seem that a
more troubling inconsistency exists between INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 and the
Bankruptcy Act's scheme for priority, than between section 191 and Bankruptcy Act §
64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
184 A "lien" affects not only the debtor and the creditor claiming the lien. Because
it is important in situations where the debtor does not have sufficient property to pay all
his debts, it has substantial impact on the debtor's other creditors. The impact of a lien
in relationships among many parties, most of whom were not parties to the transaction
creating the lien, must not be overlooked, and this is true of all liens, not just consensual
liens. It is because of the importance of focusing on the broad spread of this impact that
common definitions of "lien" are so unsatisfactory. See note 19 supra.
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need for certainty. The burden to a commercial lender may be
more than the purely financial one of subordinating one private
debt to another. The burden of uncertainty can be just as intoler-
able to a commercial lender. A burden on a lender is quickly trans-
lated into a burden on a borrower because risks will be translated
into credit costs, and certain marginal borrowers will be unable to
obtain loans, while better situated borrowers will be forced to pay
the higher costs.
Without intending to disparage the distress of a debtor's bank-
ruptcy on a creditor, it is not unfair to emphasize that the impact
of a creditor's loss is frequently exaggerated. The loss should be
viewed in the context of the total operations of a creditor. The
risk of loss is a factor in the entire debt pricing operation, so that
when default occurs, it has usually been foreseen as a cost of doing
business. A government subsidy to provide for the insolvency of a
defaulting debtor might be either a windfall for the creditor who
planned efficiently or a prop for the inefficient creditor.185
The economic impact of the government's priority, like that of
any priority rule, may be sketched in only the broadest theoretical
terms. It should seem obvious that any determination of this im-
pact must be made by Congress, not by the courts.'86 It is essential
that Congress cut through the theory and emotion that have often
characterized analyses of federal priority and learn what business-
men actually do when extending credit. It may well be that the
government's priority plays virtually no role at that stage of the
credit transaction. If Congress decides that public assistance to cred-
itors is appropriate at the opposite end of the credit transaction, that
is, upon the insolvency of the debtor, then such assistance should
be rendered by paying a subsidy to creditors. Only in this way
185 There are significant benefits for creditors presently in the tax law, in addition to
their bad debt deductions. The debtor's tax loss carrybacks generate refunds which may
be applied to the private debt. The loss carryovers are used to shelter income which is
thus freed for payment to private creditors. Some insolvency reorganizations are al-
ready tax-free under section 371 of the Internal Revenue Code, at the small price of a
basis adjustment under section 372. Other tax-free distributions can be accomplished
under usual corporate tax law. See Tillinghast & Gardner, Acquisitive Reorganizations
and Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 26 TAX L. REV. 663 (1971). As a bene-
fit to the debtors, there is very little tax consequence to the discharge of indebtedness, in
spite of the provision in section 61(a)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code that "income
from discharge of indebtedness" is income. This entire area is extraordinarily compli-
cated, and one sorely needed improvement is a simplified, clear statement of the tax law
governing reorganizations.
186 This is true not only because Congress has the responsibility to establish policy,
but also because "Congress has the fact-gathering facilities necessary for an appropriate
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can the general public be aware of what is being done. If the as-
sistance is buried in priority rules, one cannot measure in terms of
dollars spent the benefit to the creditors and the cost to the govern-
ment. Of equal importance, this means of giving relief would
identify the creditors benefitting from the subsidy. The public
might feel differently about the federal priority if it learns that
the creditors to whom the government is subordinated are the cor-
porate megaliths and the banks.
gauging of the impact of a decision .... United States v. General Douglas MacArthur
Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675, 679 (2d Cir. 1972).
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